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small Business and
Economic Development for Nebraska
;;::: A Kirchhoff

4

Fe'( In( )nlic thee lII' and research clata suggest that Nebraska polic),makers should redirect
economic lb'elopment e/tC)[LS toward the formation and grov"th of small businesses, A
mechanism is presented for categonzmg small busmesses mto sectors whICh are most
likeh'to provide the economic gro\\th so necessary to the state, Recommendations tClr
Illlpt'cnlCl1til1g a scarch and screening process to identify businesses with high-gro\\th
)otcntial in the state are discussed, Finally, recommendations tor changing policies and
:)f(lgraIl 1s tll increase the tClfl1lation and gro\\th of small businesses in Nebraska are
presentcd,

Since the early 1980s, policy formulators have been intensely
interested in the role that small businesses play in economic develop
IllenL The popular belief in post-World War II America that big
husinesses were the source of economic growth in our society has been
discredited by recent research. In 1979, Massachusetts Institute of
Technolot,'Y (MIT) published research which showed that from 1969
through 1976, small businesses created 82 percent of the net new jobs
()enerated in the United States. Other research since 1976 has added
,"
support to MIT's findings.
Evidence suggests that economic development policies should focus
on the formation and growth of small businesses, not the growth or
celocation of large businesses. This is especially important in Nebraska
\\"here, historically, economic development has emphaSized recruiting
iJrge businesses to locate new manufacturing plants in the state. Recent
research suggests that the thrust of economic development should be to
mcourage entrepreneurs to form and expand businesses in Nebraska.
Nebraska's growth in the number of nonagricultural businesses has
iJgged the growth of such businesses nationwide. According to data
puhlished hI' the US. Small Business Administration (SBA), Nebraska
had 3),459 nonagricultural business establishments in 1976; in 1982,
this number had grown by 6.1 percent to 37,638. But, nationwide, the
number of nonagricultural husiness establishments had grown by 10.3
percent 1
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To correct such lagging growth, Nebraska's policymakers are faced
with the difficulty of moving from the historical basis for economic
development to a new view based upon entrepreneurship. Three major
issues must be considered carefully: (1) Is the new view of entre.
preneurial economic growth justified; (2) How do policymakers
identify the small businesses which should be given economic develop.
ment attention; and (3) What policies can be used to encourage
entrepreneurial activity in Nebraska?

The New View of Small Business
The central question is whether economic growth based upon small
businesses is a lasting phenomenon or just a passing fad. If the new view
lacks either a theoretical base or strong empirical research support it is
likely to be a fad rather than a foundation for economic development
policies.

Theoretical Base for Entrepreneurial Growth
Historically, small businesses have not been perceived as major
contributors to economic growth. Conventional wisdom reasoned that
many small businesses were needed to produce as much economic
ac'tivity as only one big business. Thus, large businesses were the focus
of most economic development efforts. This logic was so much a part of
American life that few questioned it. John Kenneth Galbraith codified
this belief in The New Industrial State. Therein, Galbraith theorized that
our nation's economic and social fabric was controlled by a technostructure composed of large businesses, large government bureaucracies, and large labor unions working together to accomplish society's
goals of economic growth and stability. 2
The potential for economic growth in Galbraith's new industrial state
was vested in large corporations and large government bureaucracies.
Small businesses were of little importance; many economists, sympathetic to Galbraith's view, considered small businesses to be
anachronisms - inefficient and economically unimportant.

Recent Research Evidence
Yet, even as Galbraith wrote, empirical evidence was being collected
to refute his big business hypothesis. By 1979, research at MIT revealed

'incs s and Economic Dcvelopmcnt

';!11~dIIlLlS

73

'.

B) percent ofthe new jobs created in our society between 1969 and

[h~:t6 ~'ere created by firms with less than 100 employees. Dave Birch's
\'ative approach to analyzing employment data uncovered what no
economic study was capable of disclosing. And, once he
.
. . .
.
.
1ft'\ [( ,
.1 ) )]ieJ his analysIs, the traditional view that large busmesses dommate
.III
')1nic growth began to crumble. 3
l,((H1c
In quick succession, others searched for explanations for why small
bu S[,'[1es" ses' created more jobs. One answer had been found earlier, but
for the
)11e haJ been able to .explain it. In a 1976 study conducted
Ill) (
.
\~ltional Science FoundatIOn, Gellman Research AssoCIates found that
,mall businesses create 2% times more innovations than large
businesses.4 The National Science Board then examined its figures on
research and development expenditures and concluded that small
businesses generate many more innovations per dollar of research and
derelopment expense than large businesses. s Later, in a follow-up study,
Gellman Research Associates found that small businesses create more
Innorations per employee than large businesses. 6
Since the publication of David Birch's findings in 1979, the SBA has
~\stematically assembled a data base on small and large businesses
,imilar to that used by Birch. Analysis of this data base has resulted in
estimates of the percentage of net new jobs generated in the United
~t:ltes by businesses with fewer than 100 employees. This percentage
ranges from a low of 51 percent in the period 1976-80 to a high of 100
percent from 1980 to 1984.7 Clearly, since 1969, small businesses have
heen the source of job growth.
This combination of findings began to suggest an economic growth
phenomenon most unlike Galbraith's hypothesized new industrial
,tate. Instead, it identified economic growth patterns that resembled
those Jescribed by Joseph Schumpeter.
jl)

111110. )Us

Schumpeter's Entrepreneurial Economy

Schumpeter perceived the economic structure of our society as being
dominated by large businesses that find some form of mutually
Jgreeablc price, product, and quality relationship within their common
markets 8 These implicit agreements constrain the degree of competi
:Ion in the marketplace. 9
Price leadership is a commonly observed example of such con
,trained competition. General Motors (GM), for example, traditionally is
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the first u.s. automaker to announce price changes (or interest ratt
changes). The other automakers copy whatever GM announces.
Schumpeter believed that large businesses would become satisfied With
their relative market shares in such markets and seek to acquire profits
without upsetting the agreeable competitive situation.
True capitalistic competition, Schumpeter noted, emerges when
entrepreneurs discover innovations which can be used to enter markets
that are dominated by large businesses and to destroy the competitive
agreements. In so doing, entrepreneurs create profits for themselves,
expand overall economic activity, and create increased wealth for
society as a whole. Entrepreneurial growth occurs both by eroding
market shares from existing large businesses and by expanding markets
into new areas. This is Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction, that
is, creating wealth by destroying current market structures.
A good example of creative destruction is the start up and success of
Godfather's Pizza, Inc. Willie Theisen developed a combination of
innovations-pizza recipe, self-serve restaurant, pricing, restauram
motif, and advertising and promotion themes. This combination
allowed Godfather's to enter the restaurant franchise business in 1976
and become the fastest growing restaurant franchise in the United States
by 1982. At the same time, large pizza chains, such as Shakey's Pizza and
Pizza Inn, suffered considerable loss of market share while Pizza Hut was
forced to reorganize. In the meantime, the entire pizza restaurant
industry experienced a spurt in growth. Thus, Godfather's entered the
market with successful innovations, significantly changed the market
structure by eroding the market share of several established large
businesses and expanded the pizza restaurant market by appealing to a
broader segment of the population. lO
The Godfather's example and many like it make Schumpeter's theory
fit the research findings on job generation and innovation. small
innovative businesses then are the source of economic growth; they
form and grow by creatively destroying existing market structures and so
produce new wealth and new jobs.
Why do innovative entrepreneurs choose Nebraska as a place to start
businesses? Entrepreneurs start businesses where they live, and they
keep their businesses located where they live. This is logical and many
research studies have confirmed it. Godfather's was started in Omaha
because Willie Theisen lived there; in fact, it was started only a few
blocks from where he lived.

~illall
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not all small businesses are, nor should they be, creative

~t1 o~ers of the scale of Godfather's. Clearly, some small businesses in

d.esltr"s"ka can and do become Schumpeter type entrepreneurships;
\,e,r...
. I rs do not. However, examples of successful Schumpeter-type
ot
1~1'esses abound in Nebraska: Pamida, Valmont Industries, Iowa Beef
hLl~ll
, 'eSS()rs and Lindsay Sprinkler, But, where are the creative destroyers
Pnll
f tomorroW? How can they be identified? How can Nebraska establish
II llicies that facilitate formation and growth of these businesses? How
~)~~n :'>Iebraska take advantage of this new view of small business?
c

c c

c c

c

"

Identifying Small Businesses with Growth Potential
There are 7-17 million small businesses in the United States,
depending on how you count them. It is impossible to focus economic
de\'elopment efforts on all of these businesses. But, how do economic
de\'elopment specialists identify which small businesses are potentially
high-growth businesses?
polkymakers have long known that small businesses were the
backbone of Nebraska's agricultural economy, It is obvious, however,
that these agriculturally related small businesses are not the entrepreneurs on which the popular press focuses national attention.
'-Jewspapers and magazines glamorize hi-tech entrepreneurial firms,
such as Apple Computer Company, Atari, and Compaq Computer. Are
there such glamorous firms in Nebraska? Where are they? How can they
be identified?
Smallness by itself does not identify those businesses which have
high-growth potential. Instead, smallness identifies a hodgepodge of
disparate businesses characterized more by differences than by
similarities. These businesses range from family owned, neighborhood
retail stores to venture capital owned, innovative computer software
firms. Identifying which among such a variety of businesses offers
growth potential is difficult. A new, more useful segmentation of the
small business sector which identifies business growth is necessary.
Classifying Small Businesses for Economic Development
Schumpeter's theories provide a base which can be used to create a
classification of small businesses for economic development analysis.
Schumpeter noted that creative destruction resulted in growth of the
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firm's and the economy's wealth. Schumpeter implicitly assumed that
growth and innovation were synonymous; innovation produced growth
and growth emerged naturally from innovation. But, experience tells ~
otherwise. Entrepreneurs can innovate without success, and, therefore
experience no growth. Alternatively, a business can grow, even Withou~
innovation, on the strength of an initial successful innovation. For
example, Godfather's initial innovations provided it with growth fon
years.
If we recognize that innovation and growth are two separate
phenomena, we can then classifY small businesses by their innovation
rates and growth rates. Such a classification can reveal bUSiness
characteristics that are particularly relevant to economic development
Four Segments of the Small Business Sector
Using the two dimensions of innovation and growth, we can draw a
matrix that can be divided into four segments (figure 1). The first
segment is one in which firms experience low growth and low
innovation rates. This segment contains the largest number of smaIl
business firms and is called the economic core. Next is the group of
businesses that have high rates of growth but low rates of innovation.
These ambitious businesses are truly Schumpeter types in the extent to
which they creatively destroy markets, but they grow on the basis of their
initial innovations. The third group of businesses has a high rate of
innovation but these businesses have not achieved growth, that is these
businesses have constrained growth due to a lack of success in
penetrating their intended markets. Fourth are the firms that have high
rates of innovation and high rates of growth; these are the glamorous
firms upon which the popular press thrives.
Economic Core Firms

By far the greatest number of small business firms are in this category,
defined as low growth and low innovation. At the time of formation
these firms innovate enough to destroy a small portion of market
structure, such as a local market or a specialized part of a national
market, in an effort to carve out a market position that will establish and
maintain the firm. But, the innovation is not sufficiently powerful to
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initiate major market changes so the firm's growth tapers off quickly to
low and stable rate. Many retail and service firms are of this type~
neighborhood auto repair shops, retail boutiques, restaurants, even th~
locally owned franchises of national fast-food chains can be cited as
examples.
Economic core entrepreneurship is an important contributor to
economic growth for four reasons. First, formation of each small firm
creates one or more jobs and expands economic activity. A lot of
formations take place. For example, according to statistics reported in
The State oj Small Business the number of establishments in Nebraska
increased by 2,351 (6 percent) from 1976 to 1982.11 Over two-thirds (69
percent or 1,618 firms) of the net new business formations were in the
transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, insurance, real
estate and service sectors. This is typical of the economic core. Most
business formations in Nebraska are economic core firms, and each firm
creates at least one new job for Nebraska.
Second, economic core firms are the backbone of retail and wholesale
trade in rural Nebraska. Without them, the agricultural production
system would fail. In 1979, Riefler and Lamphear showed that small
businesses have been the mainstay of commercial activity throughout
the rural Midwest. 12 Economic core firms are essential to commercial
activity in Nebraska's cities as well. For example, in Omaha, few national
food retailing chains have competed successfully with the locally
owned, small retail chains. Safeway and Hinky Dinky both left Omaha,
while the locally owned firms seem to thrive. 13
Third, in periods of economic decline, small firms continue to create
jobs. Data from the U.S. Small Business Administration show that
between 1980 and 1982 (a severe recession period) firms with 100 or
fewer employees in the West North Central Region (Minnesota, Kansas,
Nebraska, Missouri, Iowa, North Dakota, and South Dakota) created
91,000 new jobs, while larger firms lost 99,000 jobs. Nationally, small
businesses created all of the net new jobs during these years. 14
Fourth, a small but important percentage of economic core firms
evolve into ambitious businesses. For example, Godfather's Pizza was
founded as Wild Willy's bar, a locally owned tavern serving southwest
Omaha. The firm's growth potential was not fully realized until it was
combined with the restaurant next door, given the name Godfather'S
Pizza, and franchised nationally.

" ',s 'ulli Economic Development

.;n dl !)u.,lIl l

"

79

,

AmhitioUS Firms
-\!l1bitiOLIS tlrms are often mixed into discussions of the highly
, . O\'ati\'e high-growth firms. The assumption is that all high-growth
Inn
.
But, am b'ItlOUS
.
f'Irms are not I11g
. hIy
'. lS are hig11I
Y 'rnnovatlve.
tull,
I1,d
' growt h'IS d enve'
. dt-rom one,
Thev' are h'Ig h
-growt
an tI
1elr
, \"nive.
Inn()
.
..
-e\\'
highlv
successful
rnnovatlons.
II' J t
.
I
-\!llbitious entrepreneurs consider growth to be their primary objec"
"I1(i concentrate their resources on the growth process. They avoid
tl\ t' "'
.
.
liluting their growth by allocatrng scarce resources to the creation of
~lddilionaJ innovations. This can be demonstrated from Godfather's
l'xperience.
Once Godfather's Pizza identified its potential for growth, it focused
its resources on growth. Early in its development, it identified an
innm'ative combination of product, price, decor, and advertising that
.;uiled consumers' tastes and produced outstanding protlts for the
franchise owner. It left this combination relatively unchanged while it
used its resources to market franchises and to guide the development of
new restaurants nationwide. Within 6 years, this combination of
innovations had rocketed Godfather's into the highest rate of growth
JI110ng food franchise operators in the United States. But, Godfather's
did not attempt to create any new innovations of the magnitude of its
uriginal combination, so as it gradually achieved geographic saturation
\\ith its franchises, its creative destruction impact became less and its
Lite of grmvth declined. This cycle is typical of ambitious businesses.
Another example of an ambitious Nebraska firm is Iowa Beef
Processors, Inc. IBP was founded in the early 1960s with the innovative
Idt:J of slaughtering, breaking, and butchering beef all under one roof.
Br the early 1970s, it had changed the entire wholesale beef business by
rmrketing boxed beef nationally and offering high quality beef at a
lower per unit processing cost. And, while the large traditional beef
processors suffered decline, u.s. per capita beef consumption rose in
lunjunction with declining constant dollar retail prices for beef.
IBP became a member of Fortune magazine's 500 largest industrial
ll)mpanies. But, in the 1970s, new competitors emerged while the
remaining untapped markets proved harder to penetrate. And, changing
,lJnsumer tastes combined with major innovations in the production,
priCing, and marketing nf chickpn (~l <:l1h"titlltp n r n , l n d I r""~"'-w1 ,,=r
L

'
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capita beef consumption. 15 IBP's rate of growth declined With the
changing industry and increased competition.
Ambitious entrepreneurs bring their innovations into a mark
structure dominated by large firms. Both Godfather's and IBP enter et
markets which most experts perceived as saturated and stable. Expeed
said that the pizza restaurant business would not support another p~
chain; they als~) said tha~ t~e wholesale and retail beef business \Vas
locked up by Wtlson and SWlft. The experts were wrong; such is the stuff
of innovative entrepreneurs.
In each of these examples, the desire of the entrepreneur to achiev
growth through exploitation of an initial innovation led to incr~
competition, increased consumer variety, and increased overall con.
sumption, that is, to new and expanded markets. But, in both examples
growth eventually declined as the innovation achieved geographi~
coverage, new competitors emerged, and market changes became
incremental. Simultaneously, the entrepreneurial firms became pan of
the big business economic structure and experienced declining growth.
The only mechanism available for continuous high rates of growth is
continuous entrepreneurial innovation.
Constrained Growth Firms

Entrepreneurial innovativeness, in Schumpeter's definition, leadsto
creative destruction of current market structure. But, in reality, some
highly innovative firms fail to destroy market structure; in such cases,
something must be constraining the firm's ability to penetrate its chosen
market.
Constrained growth firms are those highly innovative firms that
should be high-growth firms but something constrains the entre·
preneurs' efforts to enter and change markets. These constraints fall into
two classes: internal constraints and external constraints.
Internally Constrained Firms. Internal constraints are imposed by the
entrepreneur upon the firm's activities. Some entrepreneurs are
unwilling or unable to grow for reasons within their control. These
entrepreneurs accept lower levels of market penetration as necessary
conditions to achieve their other objectives, which mayor may not be
conscious objectives. In other words, some of their objectives diffe'
from Schumpeter's theoretical entrepreneurial objectives. These othf
objectives may be maintenance of individual or family control.

, K'iS
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, l'ln ce of high rates of internal change (and the strife and trauma
ted ,'lith such change), fear of failure, or simply satisfaction with
SOLI.!
.I" ,\liShing and maintaining a secure, adequate, personal income flow.
1
fl'
h
.
Entre~
l•,[.1\!:!intenance
~) contro .IS .t e ~ost common constral~t.
, 'Irs. recogt11ze that achlevmg high rates of growth reqUlres large
"I1tl
I'll s of capital, sums that exceed the firms' internal cash generating and
.
. the growth 0 ft l
'
.,L1n.1'o\v'ing
capat-'1'1"Itles. '[h us, they nee d to constram
1elr
:1(1I1
'
' capita,
. 1 that IS,
. share ownersh'Ip.
'" . or seek OUtSl'' d
e sources
0f
equity
tlri11~
Thl'\ choose t(~ con~train g~owth because they fear loss of control if they
I ' 'e ownership With outSiders.
,1.11
-'l.I1other common reason for constraining growth is income targeting.
'hl' entrepreneur seeks to achieve a level of income which satisfies
."l'rsl)!1al or family needs. Once this level of income is achieved, the
~'l1trepreneur's need to commercialize inventions and expand applica~
:1(II1S declines and growth slows. Although the entrepreneur may
Il1tinue innovating, the innovations are not commercialized as quickly,
,I
If they are not commercialized at all. Income maintenance dominates
jc"isionmaking and risk of failure makes investment in innovation and
'[(I\\th appear as a threat rather than an opportunity.
- Growth in sales and employment of internally constrained firms lags
:.11 behind putential. If the innovations are attractive enough, competi~
. Irs eventually copy them, enter the market, and carry out the creative
b[ruction. Inventors who start firms based on a patented invention are
I~cn surprised to discover that competitive entry is not prohibited by
:\!tents. Unless the patent holder aggressively commercializes and
:\p\oits the market potential ofthe invention, competitors will willfully
Ililate the patent simply because the potential profits more than justifY
:\!tent infringement penalties.
For example, a major innovation in pocket pager technology in the
~.Ifl\' 1970s occurred in the design of a battery power~conserving circuit.
;111) circuit was invented and patented by the principal owner of Reach
:iectronics Corporation in Lexington, Nebraska. The patented circuit
:\tenc\ed the life ofthe battery from 30 days to over 1 year and made the
:IICket pager a truly reliable device. But, Reach constrained its growth
l:ld moved slowly into the market. Meanwhile, Motorola copied the
Ifluit and aggressively moved into the market. The owner sued
'1l)torola and eventually won the patent suit. But, by the time the suit
'.1\ settled, Motorola had 95 percent of the u.s. pager market, and had
:lreasec! employment in Illinois by thousands.
.I ll11 \

L
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Lirge competitors fill the gap created by selfconstrained entre.
preneurs by licensing patents or by buying out the firms. But, until
ownership of internally constrained firms changes, rates of growth
remain low. Such firms meet their owners' needs but fall shon Of
fulfilling their potential for economic growth. The greatest economic
growth impact occurs when a firm grows rapidly.
externally Constrained Firms. Some entrepreneurs are unable to
obtain the resources they need to exploit their innovations. These tend
to be new, early developing, innovative firms. The cost of innovation is
so high that firms either overcome their constraints or fail within a few
years. Their products or services have not yet demonstrated market
worthiness or management has not yet proven itself capable of
performing. Thus, suppliers restrict or withhold credit, banks limit their
lending, and venture capitalists hesitate to invest, asking instead for
proof of ability to succeed.
Furthermore, suppliers of special resources, parts, or subassembli~
hesitate to supply small quantities because of high start-up costs and
credit risk. At the same time, distributors are reluctant to stock the firm's
product or even actively sell it until the market is defined or the firm
shows itself to be a survivor. This is the small business Catch 22. Showing
proof of success as required by potential investors is not possible until
after the investors invest and the markets develop.
If an externally constrained firm survives and demonstrates market
potential for its product or service, resource constraints will disappear.
In the meantime, the firm struggles for survival and remains resource
starved with an economic growth potential unfulfilled.
Another possibility is that the externally constrained firm can be
bought out by a large firm before its potential is realized. If this happens,
it is probable that the firm's potential for destroying market structure will
never be realized, because market turmoil is resisted by the large firm. It
will prefer to exploit the innovations in an orderly way that does not
radically upset the current competitive agreements in the market. Th~
may benefit the exploiting firm, but it results in reduced economic
growth for society as a whole.
Examples of externally constrained firms abound in the consulting
studies done by the Nebraska Business Development Center. Few of
these are known because they are not the focus of public attention 01
press reports. For example, Goldenrod Research Inc., of Spalding,

I
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. >\)raska, is a strug~li~? computer. manuf~cturer that is trying to raise
·. "11t canital to mltlate market mg. WhImseys of Omaha manufac
It fIcte
t
'l . nicjue Christmas tree ornaments for which there is a substantial
Ires U
tl ket a long list of new products, and a need for an investor who can
!ll~lr 'e~'e as a business manager. Which of these might be Nebraska's
Iho s
: (J!1gfo,vth firm of the 1990s?
11 I(]l'crl'iCU , cd Constrained Growth Firms. Constrained growth entre'neUfS are, in fact, small firms whose contributions to economic
11rt "t11 remain unrealized. Highly innovative, they possess the capability
lll0"
'~) become high-growth firms.
t( constrained growth firms deserve special attention by policymakers
because their economic growth potential is so great. Externally
lUJ1straineci firms are of particular interest to economic polic}'makers;
,uch firms have considerable potential for economic growth but teeter
(111 the brink of failure. The extent to which they overcome their
llll1straints will determine whether they do or do not contribute to
l'Lonomic growth. Capital, especially start-up capital to turn inventions
into innovations, is the most frequent growth constraining resource for
~ll(h firms.
Venture capital firms see many such firms but turn away most because
thev lack defined markets and management expertise. Research funded
Il\' the National Science Foundation suggests that venture capitalists
r~;rely invest in externally constrained firms. An analysis of the average
\~dlle of venture capital investments and the number of investments in
technologically innovative firms during the early and seed stages of
development reveals significantly lower investment than at later stages
IIf the firm's development. 16 Venture capital firms prefer less risky
lJ1\·estments.
On the other hand, research for the U.S. Small Business Administration suggests that informal investors appear to be the predominant
Investors in externally constrained firms. Such informal investors,
however, usually invest only an average of $25,000. 17
Furthermore, such firms are among the highest risk category of
1l1\estment ventures and, therefore, have little luck at borrowing from
financial institutions. I have demonstrated that financial institutions will
refuse to lend to such firms rather than lend at interest rates adjusted for
nsk l8 Thus, while ambitious firms usually encounter capital problems
J\Sociated with their growth, constrained growth firms encounter capital
;lroblems before growth can be realized.
\. L
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Glamorous Firms

Of all the small business segments, glamorous firms demonstrate the
greatest economic development deriving from sustained high grOwth.
These firms have high rates of innovation and achieve high rates of
growth from successful exploitation of their many innovations. GrOwth
continues as long as the firms develop innovations and successfully use
them to destroy economic structure.
These are called glamorous firms because they receive so much
publicity for their contribution to economic growth. Such firms stan
small but are rarely small for long. Once such a firm passes the period of
constrained growth, it catapults into the large firm sector. The founding
entrepreneurs become locally (or nationally) renowned, and the press
extols the virtues of successful entrepreneurship. Only the founders
understand the agony of the start up and the initial struggle to survive.
Such entrepreneurs place priority on innovation and growth. They
believe that growth is the outcome of innovation, and, therefore, they
pursue innovation. Alternatively, they may simply prefer innovation as a
way of life. Growth is sustainable as long as the firm creates innovations
that attack current markets.
Many of today's large firms began as glamorous small firms. For
example, Control Data Corporation was started by several scientists who
wanted to innovate outside the constraints of their previous employer.
Their commitment to innovation carried them into a long series of new
computers and applications and into a large corporation. Wang labora·
tories and Digital Equipment Company have similar stories. And, Apple
Computer is in the throes of proving its ability to sustain innovative
growth.
But, even highly innovative firms eventually experience declining
rates of innovation and subsequently declining growth. Once the
entrepreneurial spirit of innovation wanes, bureaucratic behaviors
emerge and entrepreneurship vanishes. Instead, large firms begin to
focus on lower risk strategies and defense of current market shares,
thereby becoming the target of new entrepreneurs.
Nebraska has examples of glamorous firms; Norden Laboratories of
Lincoln, First Data Resources of Omaha, and, most recently, Applied
Communications of Omaha. Valmont Industries, Inc., has a history that
may typity these firms. Val mont began in 1946 when Robert Daugherty
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j his uncle purchased Platte Valley Manufacturing, a firm that
ItlL
. ,nufactured farm elevators for Sears, Roebuck and Company. Although
tl1.l'cessful, the firm recognized the mechanical irrigation equipment of
~l~~nk zybach as an important innovation and bought him out in 1953.
f~:ltte Valley Manufactauring worked on the development of irrigation
~ uipment for 8 years before its market penetration became significant.
~1~11960, Platte Valley Man~facturing recognized. that its ~anufacturing
bility with steel tapered ptpe could be used to 1Onovate 10 the market
;~)r electrical utility poles. Market penetration was slow here as well.
By 1963, Platte Valley Manufacturing had only 180 employees and $6.2
million in sales. But, demand for irrigation equipment began to grow. In
1967, the firm was renamed Valmont and then a public issue of stock was
made in 1968, a year in which its annual sales reached $22.3 million. By
1976, mechanical irrigation equipment sales peaked and the firm had
des 0[$105 million. Then, electrical product sales began to grow faster
[han irrigation equipment. In 1980, total sales reached $152 million. In
1982, Val mont innovated again by forming a retail computer sales
husiness, Valcom. By 1985, Valmont's sales reached $313 million with
1.960 employees. Irrigation equipment, electrical products, and
computers-three major innovations to achieve more than a tenfold
increase in sales and employment in 20 years. 19
Glamorous firms probably represent the smallest percentage of small
tirms. Twelve to 15 percent of small firms create most new jobs,20 and
glamorous and ambitious firms constitute no more than 12-15 percent of
[hat number of small firms. Venture capital data suggest that ambitious
tlrms dominate within this group.21

!Veus of Economic Development
Ideally, economic development efforts should identify ambitious and
glamorous firms as they are formed and provide support for them as they
grow and create increased wealth for the state. But, glamorous firms
usually start as constrained growth firms and ambitious firms typically
have roots as economic core firms.
:-.Ieither glamorous nor ambitious firms are amenable to typical
g()vernment polk]' prescriptions. For example, I have shown that federal
[:LX policies, enacted on the basis that they would be good for small
husinesses, had little impact on ambitious or glamorous firms and
P()ssibly negative effects on constrained growth firms.22 Simply stated,
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once a firm enters the ambitious and glamorous categories the ability of
any public policy to affect its growth is questionable.
Thus, the greatest effect economic development policies can ha~
and should have is on the constrained growth and economic core
sectors. These sectors are characterized by formation activity and limit~
growth. Economic core firms do not aspire to growth. COnstrained
growth firms are constrained in their growth ambitions. Thus, pOlicy
prescriptions should address two principal characteristics of small
businesses:
Formation

Growth

What can be done to increase the rate of
business formations? Unless new businesses
are formed, opportunities for economic
growth eventually wane as the economic
structure becomes dominated by large firms
that are intent on defending their current
markets.
What can be done to increase the rate of
growth of businesses? Unless economic
conditions facilitate new business growth,
new business formations will stagnate as
either economic core or constrained growth
businesses. Either way, the largest part of
their contribution to economic growth will
not be realized.

Effective encouragement of entrepreneurial activities in Nebraska
requires that economic development policies address business forma·
tion and growth needs.

Encouraging Formation and Growth of Small Businesses
Resources are the essential elements of formation and growth 01
businesses. To form a business, an entrepreneur net;ds to perceive thai
the resources necessarv. for success are available. To make a busine51.
grow the entrepreneur must convert perceptions of resources into actua
rp'()llf'('f'S.
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All small businesses need four categories of resources,
• Managerial knowledge and ability in diverse areas such as per
sonne!, marketing, accounting, finance, law, and production.
• Scientific knowledge and ability in areas such as product design,
engineering, manufacturing ~ystems, and materials testing,
• Debt capital, This is money which must be repaid along with interest
to a lender at some defined future date.
• Equity capital, This is money which may (or may not) be repaid at an
undetlned future date if the firm achieves adequate earnings.
others may suggest a different list of resource categories; for example,
l'!Jssical economics uses three classes of resources, land, labor, and
capital, Land seems of little importance because it is easily inter
changeable with capital in today'sAmerican economy. Labor remains an
important variable and is incorporated in the list by referencing the
critical elements oflabor in an advanced technological economy, that is,
specialized knowledge and ability. These are the constraining charactcristics of labor resources.
111e list somewhat artificially separates knowledge into business
related subjects and scientific and engineering subjects. Managerial
knowledge is defined as business knowhow. Scientific knowledge is
defined as science and engineering knowhow. This distinction is not as
obvious to the practicing entrepreneur as it is to polky analysts, but it
remains an important designation for polky development because the
'ubjects are clearly separated within the state's educational system and
have been conventionally treated as separate subjects in the literature on
entrepreneurship.
For policy purposes, there are substantial differences between debt
Jnd equity s< lUrces of capital, For example, debt repayment is made from
earnings before taxes with interest, a tax-deductible expense, whereas
equity repayment must be made with after tax earnings. This makes
capital acquisition sensitive to tax policy. Again, entrepreneurs will not
Ilften see the difference between these two as relevant to their
IJperatiol1s. but the differences are important to policy formation. These
hlUf categories capture the essential nature of business resources for
policy develupment.
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The Motive to be Entrepreneurial

Another aspect of entrepreneurship not mentioned in the list of
resources is motivation, that spirit of human beings which fosters and
promotes the vision of business formation and growth in the minds of
men and women. No one fully understands why or where this spirit
originates, but there is no reason to believe that Nebraskans are any less
endowed with this spirit than other Americans.
Some very useful research has been conducted on the motivation of
entrepreneurs by David McClelland and others. McClelland has defined
a human characteristic called achievement motivation that is related to
entrepreneurial behavior. Several major behavioral change programs
have been developed and tested in the United States and other nations.
Generally, these programs have been successful, especially in the
formation of economic core businesses in less developed nations. 23
However, it is generally believed that middle class persons in the
United States are imbued with a significant natural tendency tOWard
entrepreneurial behavior and, therefore, behavioral change programs
are not used widely in our nation. Whether they should be more widely
used in the United States is an interesting question, but a question
outside the range of this chapter.
Managerial Knowledge and Ability
As soon as a business is formed it becomes a taxable entity. Thus, the
need for business knowledge suddenly burdens the entrepreneur with
recordkeeping. And, forever thereafter there are demands for specific
types of technical knowledge on business topics.
It is rare to find anyone in any business organization, no matter how
large, who has enough knowledge about all aspects of running a
business that advice from technical consultants is not needed. Large
businesses meet this need by hiring a bevy of experts-personnel
specialists to interview and hire, financial wizards to manipulate cash
balances, and accountants to record every action the firm takes. Bu~
small business owners or managers do not have access to these experts,
and lack of such expertise can lead to constraints upon formation and
growth.
Such lack of expertise is very specific and unique to each business and
market situation. General education programs, either credit or non·
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'edit, rarely address the individual manager's knowledge needs at the
of specificity required. Delivery of managerial assistance to small
Ie sinesses requires individualized instruction; such individualized
bl~truetiOn is conventionally called consulting, that is, a knowledgeable
I:~ ,ert communicating with a small business manager one on one.
t. \te U.S. Small Business Administration's (SBA) accumulated experinee of over 30 years of management assistance to small businesses
clearly indicates that effective management assistance for small busil es ses requires individualized consultation. It is for this reason that the
n .l',S. Congress authorized the SBA to implement the Small Business
Development Centers (SBDCs) in seven states in 1976. The SBDCs were
designed to provide management assistance to small businesses by
using the faculty of university business schools to provide consulting
~lnd training.
The SBDCs' principal program is providing individualized consulting
to small businesses. The success of this program is evident by SBA's
gradual phase out of many of its Management Assistance Programs, while
increasingly relying on the SBDCs and the Service Core of Retired
Executives (SCORE) Program, wherein retired executives consult with
small business owners individually.
No small business possesses all of the managerial expertise necessary
to cover its business needs. To facilitate business formation and growth,
individualized consulting services must be provided to small businesses, especially externally constrained growth businesses whose
constraint may be business knowledge rather than capital.
lfrel

Technical Assistance

Those who specialize in the sciences and engineering will recognize
the Similarity between the comment about specialized knowledge and
the need for individualized consulting rather than broad-brush educational programs. Each small business with a technical problem needs
specialized one-of-a-kind assistance.
Again, such consultation is needed on an individual basis. And, the
lack of such technical assistance could limit the formation and growth of
,mall bUSinesses, especially the externally constrained growth businesses whose constraining resource may be scientific knowledge rather
than financing.
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But, the differences between management assistance and technical
assistance are not as clear to working entrepreneurs as they are to
policymakers. Many business problems can be recast easily as sCientific
problems. For example, selling a high-priced product may be perceived
as a marketing problem. On the other hand, the same problem could be
perceived as a technical problem of finding a cheaper raw material for
producing the product, thereby permitting reduction of its price. This
blend of business and scientific knowledge is understood by those who
routinely perform such problem analyses, that is, entrepreneurs. But
every technical expert typically brings bias to problems so that th~
definition of the problem reflects scientific or business specialty. Thus
entrepreneurs are required to define their problems before they selec~
consultants.
This is a dilemma policymakers must face if they are to promote the
formation and growth of businesses. How can the government facilitate
problem definition so that entrepreneurs can obtain assistance, either
business or technical?
Debt Capital

Debt capital is not as readily available as economists generally
theorize. The reason is that financial institutions do not vary interest
rates to adjust for variations in risk on small business loans. Instead,
lenders tend to either lend or not lend, that is, they ration funds. And, the
lenders' assessment of risk is heavily dependent upon a firm's history of
financial performance. 24 Furthermore, when they do lend, financial
institutions charge small businesses an interest premium disproportionately large relative to the risk involved. 25
Most small businesses, especially economic core businesses, have
limited access to markets for loan funds compared with large businesses,
and, therefore, depend almost entirely upon financial institutions for
their debt capital. Under these conditions, many small businesses
simply have no access to loan funds. This is especially true for newly
formed businesses because they lack financial histories and are assessed
as high risk,>.
Economists often note that debt to asset levels among small
businesses, especially economic core businesses, are typically higher
than those of large businesses in the same industries. However,
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. nomic core businesses are usually closely held and the personal
ets of the owners are pledged as collateral for debt; because personal
asS
'
, assets, thedeb t to asset
. ets are not reporte d as part 0 f the b
usmesses
a.s~o is overstated. Thus, apparent high-debt levels are probably not out
r,~ line with conservative institutional lending practices. Furthermore,
II cent research has shown that smaller economic core businesses are
r~ore profitable and demonstrate less risk as measured by their profits
~datiVe to their debt obligations than larger businesses in the same
.
26
industries.
contrary to popular opinion, small businesses are not high-risk
borrowers. Thus, economic core businesses are capable of handling
birly large amounts of debt relative to their larger counterparts. So the
cost and availability of loan funds from institutional lenders is an issue of
importance to policymakers who are committed to encouraging the
formation of new businesses, especially among economic core firms
which, among other things, regularly spawn ambitious firms.
t'lO

Equity Capital
New businesses, especially those with considerable growth potential,
need patient money. Patient investors understand that such businesses
typically do not earn profits in excess of their internal cash needs for 7-10
rears. Although the returns the investor eventually reaps may more than
justify the wait, the investor must be patient.
Typically, these patient investors are not venture capital firms but
individuals who invest $25,000 to $50,000 and patiently wait for the
long-term payback. Such individuals playa vital role in the formation
and early stage development of glamorous and ambitious small
businesses. It is essential that entrepreneurs have access to patient
investors, investors who have been characterized as informal investors.27
There are good reasons why patient investors are needed for firms that
pursue high growth objectives. Growth, especially high growth, con~umes much capital. Thus, ambitious and glamorous firms rarely
generate cash equal to their internal needs. They have little or no ability
II) repay investors for many years even when profit margins are high. This
means that ambitious and glamorous firms cannot depend on debt as a
major source of financing because debt to financial institutions brings an
Ilhligation to repay within 5 years or less. 28 Typically, principal and
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interest payments begin in the first period after the loan is made. Debt
repayment is a cash outflow that can constrain the firm's rate of grOwth
thereby decreasing the ability to produce economic growth.
'
Too often entrepreneurs seek and obtain debt capital only to diScover
that debt repayment exhausts their initial success and drains their firms'
ability to grow. Thus, an economic core firm is formed, grows to a
limited size, and then stabilizes as it services its debt. The constrained
growth firm is formed and then exhausts its capital in debt repayment
while it is still in the early innovation stage of development. It then
struggles to obtain more debt, never realiZing that it is the debt capital
that is constraining its rate of growth.
Exceptions to these general observations exist but there are many
reasons why informal investors are often referred to as investor angels. A
viable economic development policy should address the informal
investor issue. Without patient money, many potentially ambitious
businesses will remain in the economic core and many potential
glamorous businesses will never break free of constrained growth.
Eventually, as the entrepreneur begins to reap profits, the firm
develops the need for large sums of capital (millions of dollars). With
good planning (and a little luck), the firm will become sufficiently
attractive so that it can obtain financing from venture capital firms.
Venture capital is Widely available in the United States and, although
only two somewhat limited venture capital firms operate in Nebraska
today, there are several regional firms that are constantly searching the
Midlands for potential investments.
Another opportunity for capital acquisition is the public issue of stock.
Although somewhat more expensive, a public issue can raise large sums
of capital while avoiding taking on a significant Single owner who may
attempt to control the firm.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Nebraska has not provided adequate
venture capital for its growing firms. Many Nebraska growth firms have
found it desirable or necessary to sell themselves to large corporations
to meet their growth needs. First Data Resources sold itself to American
Express. Behlen Manufacturing of Columbus sold itself to Wickes.29
Swanson Foods sold itselfto Campbell Soup after many years of success.
Norton Laboratories, Skinner Macaroni Company, the list goes on and
on. One cannot help wondering if these sales resulted in more
economic growth in the home state of the acquiring firm rather than in
Nebraska.
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Public policy needs to address the issues of informal venture capital
for economic core and con~trained growth firms and venture capital for
ambitiOUS and glamorous firms.

Sununary of Resource Needs
This review of the character of the required resources and the
limitations on these resources shows how the formation and growth of
'Ilull businesses can be constrained and makes it evident that the
~
)rimary assistance needs lie among the economic core and constrained
~ro\vth firr.ns. Firms from these sec~ors th~t a~pire.t~ ent~r t~e gla~or?~s
and ambitious sectors are faced With major l11efflclencles 111 avaIlablltty
of resources through the private sector. Information and capital are not
readily available. The business and scientific knowledge needed may be
prohibitively expensive if it is purchased from private consultants. While
debt capital is expensive and difficult to obtain for most small firms, debt
capital is not available from lending institutions at any cost for newly
formed firms, unless the entrepreneurs have personal assets to pledge.
Many business formations fail at the outset for lack of capital and
knowledge. If formation is succesful, debt capital eventually becomes
available, hut then the small business must seriously question whether
debt is appropriate for the firm's growth objectives. Private sector
business and scientific assistance continue to be expensive relative to
the firm's revenues, and the entrepreneurs somehow must possess the
knowledge necessaty to define what assistance they need before an
expert consultant can be requested. Growth requires patient investment
capital. Yet, finding an investing angel is far from easy in Nebraska.
Once firms grow into ambitious or glamorous status, their technical
assistance and debt capital needs are addressed adequately within the
private sector. They are capable of purchaSing both business and
scientific expertise, either by hiring employees or by paying consultants.
And, they have greater access to debt capital markets simply because
they have histories of strong financial performance. However, acquisition oflarge sums of venture capital may be constrained in Nebraska, so
many firms have sought and obtained acquisition by wealthier firms
headquartered outside of Nebraska.
These are the issues which Nebraska policymakers need to address to
promote economic development. The formation and growth of small
businesses 'Nill contribute greatly to economic development within the
state.

94

Bruce A Kirchhoff

Public Policies to Address Small Businesses' Needs
Before describing policies which will address the problems of
formation and growth of small businesses, there are several caveats
about popular economic development myths which must be addressed.
Numerous, simple broad-brush policies are frequently mentioned in the
popular press, political campaign rhetoric, and even among economic
development specialists. Recruiting new plants with tax reductions
employee training programs, and tax free property remain popular:
Assisting high-technology startups with state equity investment capital,
technology incubators, and innovation centers are equally new~worthy.
But, caution must be exercised before leaping into popular programs
without carefully assessing Nebraska's unique business environment.

Problems with Recruiting Big Businesses' Plants

There are no quick and easy solutions to Nebraska's problems.
Emphasizing publicly visible, front-page newsworthy, flashy solutions to
economic development is a futile exercise, perhaps even publicly
irresponsible. Spending large sums of money to recruit a major
manufacturing plant from a large corporation is a high-risk adventure. If
one wins, it can be politically rewarding, but a loss may exhaust the
limited resources of the state.
Even if a new plant comes to Nebraska, it may take years for the plant
to generate spin off businesses, that is, new small firms formed from the
technology base of the large firm, either as suppliers or competitors of
the large firm. Or spin-offs may never occur. Where are the spin-offs from
New Holland's combine plant in Lexington? There are none because
New Holland did not bring any technology base with this plant. This is
not uncommon with large corporation assembly plants. 3o Not surprisingly, there are no spinoffs from Kawasaki's motorcycle plant in Lincoln.
There are assembly jobs in Lincoln but the technology base is in Japan.
Unless an expansion or relocated plant brings a complete core of
technology and husiness experts with it, spinoffs are unlikely. An
environment conducive to new technology-based business t<xmations
requires a core, a critical mass of technology. Such a core oftechnolOh'Y
flleled Silicon Valley around San Jose, California.
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rechnologically Based Economic Development Experiences
It is doubtful that any state can duplicate the exact experience of
.;ilicon Valley, or Route 128 around Boston, or Bionic Valley in Salt lake
Cit\'. A look at the reality of these examples may help explain why.
Every state wants its own Silicon Valley like California. But, reality is
somewhat different. Researchers at Stanford Research International
(-ound that Silicon Valley had its roots in the founding ofHewlett-P'dckard
Corporation in a garage in San Mateo during the late 1930s. later,
.;ran ford University was pressed for money to modernize its research
laboratories, so it began cooperative research with Hewlett-Packard in
the 1950's. Attracted by these researchers, the developer of the transistor
left Bell Laboratories, moved to Silicon Valley and started a new
transistor manufacturing operation. Growth was slow but continuous as
new electronics firms began as spin-offs from Hewlett-Packard and
stanford University. Silicon Valley, as we know it today, took 30 to 40
rears to develop.31
. Route 128 in Boston is another model often recommended in
~ebraska. Published research by Bennett Harrison documents the
decline of the New England textile and shoe industries beginning
around the turn of the century and culminating in high rates of
unemployment during the 1960s and early 1970s. This high unemployment laid the foundation for Boston's rejuvenation by preparing
workers for radical changes in careers, from stitching shoes to programming computers. Even as late as 1973-75, Boston had one of the
highest unemployment rates in the nation. The Boston area's economy
hecame really bad before it began to get better. 32
Utah's Bionic Valley, teamed the University of Utah with entrepreneurs
and a federally funded innovation center. This spawned a bevy of
high-tech medical companies that are producing mechanical hearts,
artificial kidneys, and bionic human arms. Again, careful research shows
that Bionic Valley has its roots in a major commitment to science made
hythe President of the University of Utah 20 years ago. And, Bionic Valley
is only now beginning to payoff for Utah. 33 Just as Utah's economic
development had a long-term horizon, it also had an arduous journey.
The University of Utah maintained its commitment to medical research
in spite ofthe state legislature's reduction of its budget during the 1970s
I measured in deflated dollars) and the cancellation of federal funding
for its innovation center after only 4 years.
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These stories show the special nature of economic development.
There are few, if any, commonalities to the way economic success came
to these three areas. Each state must carve its own story, its own Special
way of achieving growth.
Nebraska's Limited Resources
Nebraska has special problems, not the least of which is severe limits
on public revenues. The people of Nebraska have decided to reduce
proportionally the property tax on agriculture, and, by computing
income tax as a percentage of the federal income tax, Nebraska has
decided to draw proportionately smaller income taxes from agricultural
operations. Essentially, Nebraska has decided to reduce taxes on its
largest industry, thereby reducing its revenue generating capaCity.
Although Nebraska has high tax rates, the base is narrow, so it collects
relatively low revenues.
Furthermore, in Nebraska the major business and population center
(Omaha) and the university's technology center (Lincoln) are geo·
graphically separated. The three examples cited above had universities
located within their geographic areas, and they were part of the
economic development stories. The Board of Regents of the University
of Nebraska merged the University of Nebraska at Omaha engineering
school into the University of Nebraska-Lincoln to avoid program
duplication and to conserve scarce financial resources. But, the long·
term result was a geographical barrier to building a technology core in
Omaha.
Policy Recommendations

Given these caveats, there are some specific policy recommendations
which are essential to the economic development of Nebraska. Each of
the follOWing requires action by Nebraska's state government so that the
four needs of economic core and constrained growth businesses can be
better met, thereby fostering increased formation and growth of
businesses.
Two areas cry out for immediate short run attention: assistance with
business knowledge and availability of informal venture capital. In the
longer run, assistance with scientific knowledge is also needed.
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}faintain and Improve Business Assistance
There are three reasons why the state should target husiness
ahove all other policies. First, most economic core and
'I'~ ,
~';)nstrained growth husinesses in the state are not users of high
technology and, therefore, they are unlikely to spawn science·hased
~lInbitioUs or glamorous husinesses. Most are service businesses; those
that are in man ufacturing use relatively little advanced technology. 'Thus,
knowledge constraints on these businesses are likely to be husiness
knowledge.
Second, Nehraska's post·secondary educational system does not have
J reputation for state· of the art technology in any applied high·
technology field. Simply stated, currently the critical mass technology
does not exist in this state's higher education system. 34 Thus, building a
,rate·of.theart technical base will require a long· term commitment,
,uch as the University of Utah's 20·year commitment to bionic medical
research. Little can be done in the short run.
Third, the technology base in Nebraska resides among private sector
businesses and, as such, is amenable to business knowledge assistance
rather than technical assistance. For example, computer software for
financial transactions has become a major business in Omaha. First Data
Resources, Inc., and Applied Communications, Inc., serve as the core ofa
growing field in which many small firms now operate. Another example
exists in central Nebraska where many electronics manufacturing firms
are located, for example, Reach Electronics in Lexington and Dale
Electronics in Columhus. Facilitating technology transfer among similar
tlrms requires husiness assistance rather than scientific consulting. Thus,
business assistance is the major priority in Nebraska for encouraging
increased formation and growth of small businesses.
"I'sta nce

Jfaintain the Current Level of Business Assistance
Maintenance of business assistance programs is first among polic)'
prescriptions hecause the federal government is reducing its commit·
ment to funding such assistance in Nehraska. The state must act to
[('place this funding or the level of business assistance will decline. For
l'"ample, the Nehraska Business Development Center (NBDC) is ahout
t() lose half of its federal funds. NBDC provided consultations to 1,165

98

Bruce A Kirchhoff

Nebraska businesses in 1985. This activity will be cut in half in 1987
unless the federal funding is properly replaced and matched, a decision
the Legislature must make in early 1987.

Expand Business Consulting Activities
Because no one can predict which economic core or cOnstrained
growth businesses will succeed, the proper polic)' is to help all small
businesses. However, those that appear to have the potential for high
growth should be identified during the consulting process and moved
into a more intensive assistance program.
Nebraska should develop a two tiered business assistance program.
The first tier should be designed to provide consulting to all economic
core and constrained growth businesses. Additionally, business consultants should be trained to screen these businesses to identify those with
high-growth potential. Businesses with high-growth potential should be
passed on to a second-tier business assistance program.
This second tier of management assistance should reduce significantlythe resource constraints these businesses experience. The second
tier of consulting programs should contain science and technology
consultants as well as more specialized business consultants. For
example, businesses should be able to obtain technical advice on
designing plants and procuring scientific materials. Management assistance should include specialized knowledge, such as legal assistance on
franchising, accounting assistance on financing schemes, broker advice
on stock issues, and introductions to informal venture capitalists.
This program could be designed so that each firm in the assistance
program would be assigned to a lead consultant. The lead consultant
would follow the monthly progress of the firm and direct technical
specialists to consult with the firm as needs develop. Such an
arrangement would ensure the firm of technical assistance and also
assistance in identifying problems. The lead consultant could match the
state sponsored assistance resources to the client's needs.
This second tier of intensive consulting is very important to removing
constraints on potential ambitious and glamorous businessses. Yet, it is
velY risky because useful guidelines for identifying successful businesses have not been developed. Many of the assisted firms will fail,
others will struggle along with little or no growth, but, a few will
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"eed . The fewwill have to be the total measure of success of the effort
,
1 expense expended.
'InU '
. The twO tier system of consulting allows for some reduction in the
11b er of clients served by the more intensive and expensive second
nlll
.
r
The first tier could use NBDC's faculty and student consultants.
(Ie '
'!11ese consultants could weed out the many entrepreneurs with
underde\Oeloped plans and those with fantasies, not dreams. Most
\enwre capitalists yearn for such a screening system and acknowledge
that they typically read a lot of fantasy business plans before they see a
realistic dream.
A separate organization for the second tier of consulting is not
necessary; it is only necessary to organize and operate the consulting
serdce differently. It may be desirable to house the second-tier lead
consultants in the NBDC because it currently has the broadest geographiC coverage of the state. However, under its current federally
~Jl1ded programs, NBDC cannot provide more than three consultancies
tll a firm within a 2 year period. Thus, state funding would be required to
fund this second-tier consulting program.
~L1ll

Promote Networks Among Technologically Based Firms
Substantial technical assistance is available through networking
among technologically based firms. For example, a recently started
computer manufacturing firm in Spalding, Goldenrod Research, Inc.,
interacts with Farrall Electronics, Inc., in Grand Island to exchange
information. Such networking should become more organized for the
henefit of more electronics firms, especially the newly formed and
developing firms.
Other technologically based businesses should have Nebraska networks. Formal network linkages should be created among such firms.
For example, a network of interaction and communication among the
electronic manufacturing firms in central Nebraska may reduce con
qraints on growth and allow the firms to grow more rapidly, thereby
creating more jobs.
Such networks could be developed by the second-tier consultants
,uggested in the first policy recommendation. The lead consultants
muld he aSSigned by industry so that they could organize and facilitate
these networks.
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Provide Informal Venture Capital
A<; noted earlier, the informal investor is needed to provide equity
capital to economic core and constrained growth firms that ar
struggling to grow. But, informal investors are few and far between.1'h e
are in Nebraska, but they are not organized into an accessible grOUp~
Other states have formed venture capital clubs to serve as focal points
for developing a network of informal investors. Such a club has been
formed in Omaha and now has 38 full-time members. Efforts to form a
club in Grand Island have begun with some success. However, the State
Banking Department believes that these venture capital clubs violate
Nebraska's securities laws. Their view is that presentation of an
investment plan at a venture capital club meeting is equivalent to
offering to sell stock to everyone in attendance. Using this interpretation
the presentation at Grand Island's first venture capital club meeting:
attended by 200 to 300 individuals, was a gross violation of Nebraska's
securities laws which limit unregistered stock offerings to a maximum of
35 persons.
The State Banking Department should be requested to draw up
appropriate legislation to allow entrepreneurs to make presentations at
venture capital club meetings without violating securities laws. Thus,
venture capital clubs could be organized statewide to facilitate economic
development throughout the state. Funds should be appropriated to
promote and advise communities in the formation of venture capital
clubs. Coordination among these clubs should be a necessity as well.
Again, these assistance and coordination activities should be assumed
by existing state organizations.

Develop Business and Scientific Assistance and an Innovation Center
Entrepreneurs seldom perceive the clear separation between busi·
ness and scientific assistance. They have an innovation and want it to
become a business. Thus, entrepreneurs need assistance in separating
problems into business and scientific categories. Nebraska should
establish an innovation center with the primary purpose of consulting
with entrepreneurs to define their problems and to guide them into
proper consulting relationships.
The innovation center should be a joint effort combining manage·
ment and scientific assistance. It should function as a clearinghouse for
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, -!11iS innovation center need only have a small staff because it could
\ . w its business and scientific experts from the universities and
~l~~~iness communities of Nebra~ka, But, it needs a large bud~et for
, 1sul
lll[
. tin g expenses and promotIon expenses, unless the state Implel11ents the two-tier management assistance (consulting) program
rccommended earlier. The two-tier management assistance program
\\ollid screen businesses; move them up to the second tier, as dictated
h\ an assessment of their potential for growth; and, once in the second
ti~r. direct them to the innovation center for assessment. The innovation
lenter should be publicized within Nebraska so that budding entre
preneurs know where to obtain help,
The two tiered management assistance system, combined with the
Innovation center, could provide a coordinated assistance program that
\\ollid serve all of Nebraska's small businesses that seek assistance. It
llluid also identity those firms that have significant economic development potential and provide high-potential firms with specialized
management and scientific assistance designed to release them from
their constraints.
Build a Long-range Technology Base

\clost areas of the United States have drawn their economic development from a few related industries. In the late nineteenth century, New
England grew through the development and expansion of textile and
,hoe industries. In the first half of this century, Detroit, Pittsburgh, and
Cleveland grew with the steel and automobile industries. After World
\\a[ II, Houston grew with oil and natural gas. Even Nebraska grew,
,lowly but steadily, throughout the post-World War II period with
JgricuJture and food products. Now, like Detroit, Cleveland, and
Houston, Nebraska is looking for a new economic base.
It is difficult to have the technological foreSight to identity the growth
:echnology of the 1990s. Such foresight is the focus of thousands of
:inancial analysts who study industry after industry and product after
~[()duct trying to identity the best investment opportunities. Among the
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three economic success stories described earlier, only one resulted fr
an overt decision by a public official to choose a specific technology. ~~
President of the University of Utah chose biotechnology. How~ e
assuming that Nebraska's government can somehow match the valu;er,
this guess is foolhardy.
of
A scatter-gun approach to research and develoment may yield SOIne
results, but Nebraska does not have enough resources to shoot at th
problem. The $2 million authorized by the last legislature for the
Research and Development Authority is miniscule compared Wi~
spending by major corporations to find new industries and products.
For Nebraska, the proper polk)' is to ask the university to pick a few
scientifically talented individuals who possess the characteristics of
entrepreneurship. The legislature should provide special appropriations
to the university to fund research professorships for scientists who have
the ability to create innovations and the potential to commercialize their
innovations. These people should be supported for at least 10 years
before any core of new firms can be expected in Nebraska's hightechnology center, Cornhusker Plain.
After 10 years, another long-term investment in the future must be
made; several more people with various technological specialties
should be brought into the university so that when the new technology
of Cornhusker Plain runs its course and begins to fade another core of
technology will emerge to vital ize the state. The Boston experience of3O
to 50 years of decline prior to renewed economic growth need not be
repeated in Nebraska.

Recommendations on the Research and Development Authority
The 89th Legislature gave Nebraska the ubiquitous Nebraska Research
and Development Authority (NRDA). NRDA has been assigned the
responsibility of resolving the legislature'S indecision about what is best
for Nebraska's economic development. The legislature assigned all
activities to NRDA: for example, identifY technological problems,
proVide financial investment, advise universities, recommend legislation, coordinate efforts to attract new technology businesses, establish
research and development centers, establish incubator facilities,
coordinate information development, and distribute and develop a
communications network.

;[llJiI
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I 'Clntages oJ NRDA The advantages ofNRDA are many. First, it places
A( I , in the hands of an appointed group of professionals who are
ll)ne~
..
11,llv shielded from the day~to~day pressures of polItICS, Second,
,Ylrt lJ

, few 1ega I constramts
.
. resources.
.'fl,DA has
on h
ow'It can a 11 ocate Its
\ '.d NRDA has no tradition, no established pattern of procedures and
1.~~el~ditureS which it must defend as it tries to ~evelop a n~w app.roach
l! 'onomic development. Fourth, and most Important, It proVIdes a
tl) el
C
f
.
.
ram that could take the lorm 0 the mnovatlon center recom~
prog
h
.
.
b
'
d .
.
: 'Illied above, t at IS, a program to revIew usmess an mnovatlve
.1;~JS of entrepreneurs, to provide definitions of the kind of assistance
\ uired, and to direct the entrepreneurs to the assistance, In this way,
~~A could Significantly improve the chances for an early flowering of
"t1trepreneurship in Nebraska.
There does not seem to be any reason why the NRDA could not
,upport the second tier of management assistance programs recom~
mended above. So, perhaps with an administrative decision, the NRDA
could resolve the current weaknesses of management and scientific
.lssistance 'vvithin the state. Given the impending decline in federal
funding, NRDA should act quickly to replenish the supply of funds
needed to maintain the current management assistance programs.
iFeakJw\ses oj NRDA NRDA has several Significant weaknesses. First,
.IIlO foremost, the legislation does not target formation and growth of
,mall businesses, Thus, NRDA's resources can be sought actively by large
husinesses, And, large businesses will be more effective in acquiring
,uch resources,
Experience with federal agencies shows that there is a big business
hias in federal procurement of research and development, although
procurement policies are supposed to treat all suppliers equally.
Congress specifically identified and countered this bias in 1982 by
PJssingl11e Small Business Innovation Development Act (SBIDA), This
Jet requires most federal agencies to spend a prescribed percentage of
their extramural research and development funds with small busi
nesses,lS
Unless the 01ebraska Legislature amends Bill 850 (the NRDA autho~
riling legislation) large businesses will exert their economic influence
il) usurp the resources that should be dedicated for small businesses,
The 90th Legislature should make it a priority to amend Legislative Bill
~)O to specify that NRDA's purpose is to assist small businesses primarily.
\\ithout this change, even the managerial and scientific assistance that is
!

104

Bruce A Kircl.l._

'n.JQJJ

possible through NRDA's funding activities may be misdirected to I
businesses. If this happens, Nebraska's entrepreneurial develop~e
will be delayed and perhaps seriously threatened.
ent
Second, NRDA's investment and lending role draws on pUblic funds
and is, therefore, legitimately subject to public scrutiny. Such publ'
scrutiny assures that NRDA's expectations for risk and timeliness ~~
return will be similar to those of a bank, not an informal venture investo
But, informal investment funds and patient investment funds are ~
Nebraska's constrained growth businesses need most.
NRDA will behave conservatively for simple reasons. NRDA Will
realize that it cannot justify (to the taxpayers) investment decisions
which provide patient money to risky, innovative small bUSinesses. If
such businesses fail to repay or delay repayment for long periods of
time, criticism by taxpayers will be vigorous. Informal investment
cannot be made with public funds. The directors will risk the existence
of the NRDA if they make the kind of patient equity investments that
Nebraska's small business communities need. Other states have established publicly funded venture capital organizations, but no state has
successfully installed a publicly funded patient investment organization.
The 90th Legislature should amend the NRDA Act to exclude equity
financing from NRDA's charter. The resources will be used more
effectively if, instead, NRDA encourages the formation of venture capital
clubs and pushes for the legalization of their activities. Furthermore,
NRDA can encourage the formation of private venture capital firms. This
effort could be part of the innovation center or the second-tier
management assistance program recommended earlier.
NRDA's mandate is sufficiently broad to provide opportunities for
developing technical assistance for the long-term technology base
recommended. However, it will be better if the legislature deals directly
with the University of Nebraska in establishing funding for research
professorships to develop a core of science and technology.
On balance, NRDA can be a Significant factor in establishing an
environment for the promotion of small businesses in Nebraska. But, the
legislature must amend its authorization to focus its activities on small
businesses.
Business Recruitment Versus Business Development
Throughout this chapter I have argued that Nebraska should invest in
developing businesses and encourage formation and growth of small
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, sses, The argument has been advanced that recruiting branch
j)Uslne(;f big businesses is not cost effective in establishing economic
1)I~llltls pl11 en t. Both the theory of Schumpeter and the economic
I ,\'e 0
L t
, rch findings of the last 10 years support this view.
re):Jt the question arises persistently whether the state should divide its
11~~ between recruiting big businesses and developing small busid ()e's The question arises because it is difficult to break with tradition,
l:es~1~~l110re, although big business plant expansions are insignificant
!'urttrl'butors to natlona
.
I growth ,they can contf!' b
' .f'lcantIy to IocaI
ute slgm
(lIn
regional growth.
llr The reality remains, however, that Nebraska is one of 50 states that
d\'ertise, promote, and beg for plants from large firms. Nebraska has a
;~i 'h taX rate and no outstanding physical or population characteristics.
h~ry advantage that Nebraska cites in its advertising and promotional
literature is claimed by at least ten other states.
But. Nebraska cannot turn its back on firms that are locating new
plants or offices, Instead, it must provide information that will allow
them to assess Nebraska along with their other alternatives. It probably
~dso needs to continue offering tax incentives, such as reduced property
t;LXes, to meet the competitive pressures of other states.
The governor should direct the Department of Economic Development to maintain an information center that will promote the virtues of
IJrious communities throughout the state to large corporations that are
considering new plant locations in Nebraska. This information should
he supplied to every business that requests it. However, the aggressive
activities of recruitment, such as advertiSing, promotional visits to large
businesses, and gubernatorial visits to corporate executive suites,
~hould be discontinued, Such activities are very expensive and the
money can be better invested in Nebraska's small businesses. A passive
program of responding to firms' requests for information about
\ebraska is recommended, Substantial money can be saved bya<;suming
a cooperative but passive approach to business recruitment.

Conclusions
:.lebraska should recognize that Schumpeter described the future as
an entrepreneurial economy. Given this model, I recommend a grass
roots effort to coax Nebraska's current entrepreneurial potential into
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flowering to produce new firms and new jobs in the next 10 years.1h
core of this grass roots effort is creating an economic environment that.e
conducive to providing assistance to help new businesses overcol1llS
their constraints so that they can grow and prosper. Their Successes \\Iil~
in turn, create more new firms from spin-offs.
Pooling the state's resources to provide management assistance to
each economic core and constrained growth business will stimulate
economic activity. Facilitating capital acquisition through venture capital
clubs in all major cities will assure patient capital for the stimulated
entrepreneurial activity. Establishing a small business innovation center
through NRDA will help entrepreneurs define their opportunities and
needs. And, developing several core technologies through selected
university professorships will assure a revitalization of economic growth
in future generations.
Although all of these actions seem expensive in a state with severely
limited resources, some of the costs have already been allocated to
economic development through the NRDA. And, some costs can be paid
by transferring funds from business recruitment activities.
I
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